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Abstract
Understanding stock correlations is crucial to asset pricing, investor decision-making, and financial risk regulations. However, a
microscopic explanation based on agent-based modeling is still lacking. We here propose a model derived from minority game for
modeling stock correlations, in which an agent’s expected return for one stock is influenced by the historical return of the other
stock. Each agent makes a decision based on his expected return with reference to information dissemination and the historical
return of the stock. We find that the returns of the stocks are positively (negatively) correlated when agents’ expected returns for
one stock are positively (negatively) correlated with the historical return of the other. We provide both numerical simulations and
analytical studies and give explanations to stock correlations for cases with agents having either homogeneous or heterogeneous
expected returns. The result still holds when other factors such as holding decisions and external events are included which broadens
the practicability of the model.
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1. Introduction
Stock correlations are high during financial crises, i.e., the
stock prices move up or down together. This is a phe-
nomenon in stock markets worldwide, which has drawn the at-
tention of many scholars (Aste et al., 2010; Didier et al., 2012;
Sharma and Banerjee, 2015; Kim et al., 2015; Liu and Tse,
2012). Understanding this phenomenon is very important for
investors and regulators. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) first
found that stock return correlations among US firms are too
high to be justified by fundamentals only, while company size
and degree of institutional ownership could also influence stock
correlations.
Later on, scholars have explained stock correlations from
the macroscopic perspective, i.e., the market and industry
level. Some studies focus on the correlation of stocks in
markets (Morck et al., 2000; Didier et al., 2012; Dang et al.,
2015; Li and Peng, 2017). Morck et al. (2000) and Dang et al.
(2015) found that stock correlations tended to be higher in
poor and emerging markets with poor institutions and prop-
erty rights. Didier et al. (2012) found that stock price co-
movements were driven largely by financial linkages be-
tween markets. Li and Peng (2017) noted that economic
policy uncertainty were able to affect the comvoements of
both Chinese and US stocks. Some studies focus on the
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correlation of stocks in industries (Kallberg and Pasquariello,
2008; Anto´n and Polk, 2014; Huang et al., 2016; Peng et al.,
2017). Kallberg and Pasquariello (2008), Anto´n and Polk
(2014) showed that firms in the same industry had correlated
earnings and therefore returns. Huang et al. (2016) showed that
the information dissemination through firms in the same indus-
try would cause a stock price co-movement. Peng et al. (2017)
adduced a strong evidence of size effect on stock price syn-
chronicity in Chinese oil firms.
Other studies have explained stock correlations from the per-
spective of firms. Several studies have shown that a firm’s
specific information is the primary cause of stock correlations
(Hameed et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015). Others have explained
stock correlations with complex network methods (Qiao et al.,
2016; Zhang et al., 2015; Li et al., 2012). Qiao et al. (2016)
have found that stock network linkages could explain stock cor-
relations. Zhang et al. (2015) simulated information dissem-
ination on a firm network, and predicted the stock price co-
movements with the ECM (Energy Cascading Model). Li et al.
(2012) have found that the prices of stocks moved together
along with the shareholder link network and the director net-
work. All these studies suggest that the more closely firms are
linked in the network, the higher correlations they have.
Recently, scholars have also studied stock correlations
from the perspective of investors’ actions (Li et al., 2011;
Eun et al., 2015; Li and Zhao, 2016; Frijns et al., 2017;
Filzen and Schutte, 2017; Veldkamp, 2006; Mondria, 2010).
Some empirical studies show that investors’ sentiment and
irrational actions will cause stock correlations (Li et al.,
2011; Eun et al., 2015; Li and Zhao, 2016; Frijns et al., 2017).
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Li et al. (2011) found that investors’ irrational actions could
cause stock price co-movements by studying the Chinese A-
share markets. Eun et al. (2015) found that culture influences
could cause stock price synchronicity by affecting investors’
trading activities and a country’s information environment.
Li and Zhao (2016) found that investors preferred to trade the
stocks of firms which stayed in their own city, and this be-
havior could cause stock price co-movements. Frijns et al.
(2017) found that stock return comvemnents were driven by
the non-fundamental part of return, which was mainly the in-
vestor sentiment. Other studies focus on information dissem-
ination through investors (Filzen and Schutte, 2017; Mondria,
2010; Veldkamp, 2006). Filzen and Schutte (2017) found
that stock price would co-move when investors could acquire
low cost information about other firms by empirical analysis.
Mondria (2010) proved that asset prices would co-move when
agents could simultaneously get the price information of the
both assets to forecast asset prices through analytical analysis.
Veldkamp (2006) proposed a theoretical model to demonstrate
that when rational agents could get information of stocks si-
multaneously, stock prices would co-move with no correlation
between stock fundamentals. To date, only few studies are de-
voted to explain the microcosmic reason of stock correlations
from the perspective of agents’ actions, most of which are based
on theoretical analysis. Our study is motivated by research on
stock correlations with agent-based models and reveal its mi-
crocosmic mechanism by modeling the trading behavior of in-
dividual agents.
Minority game is a highly successful agent-based model that
can be used to explain most stylized facts in financial markets
(Challet et al., 2001b). The standard minority game was first
proposed by Challet and Zhang (1997) based on the El Farol
bar problem (Arthur, 1994). It describes a system in which
heterogeneous agents adaptively compete for scarce resource,
and it captures some key features of a generic market mecha-
nism and the basic interactions between agents and public in-
formation. As a successful agent-based model to simulate the
stock market, minority game has been under rapid develop-
ment and largely used in memory size (Johnson et al., 1999),
evolution mechanism (Challet et al., 2001a), strategy selection
(D’Hulst and Rodgers, 1999; Zhong et al., 2005), stock market
simulations (Yeung et al., 2008), market impact (Barato et al.,
2013) and agent behavior (Zhang et al., 2016). One of the most
important applications of the minority game is its modeling for
multi-assets. Bianconi et al. (2008) first studied the minority
game in which agents might invest two assets to investigate
speculative trading effects in stock markets. De Martino et al.
(2007) introduced a multi-assets minority game to solve the
strategy frequency problem. Inspired by their works, we here
introduce a new model based on minority game in which agents
may trade two stocks, and focus on its explanation to stock cor-
relations. This extension makes the model closer to the real
stock markets, and can be widely applied to asset pricing, in-
vestor decision-making and financial risk regulations.
We propose that an agent’s expected return on one stock
is influenced by its own historical return and the historical
return of the other stock. This expected return is modeled
with reference to studies on the theory of information dissem-
ination and the facts that exist in real stock markets. Some
studies on information dissemination theory imply that stock
price movements are influenced by the spread of information
among investors (Bordino et al., 2012; Heiberger, 2015). In ad-
dition, Zhang et al. (2015) and Chuang (2016) found that the
stock price co-movement is due to the dissemination of in-
formation between firms, and Chen et al. (2015) proposed that
for the firms shared common information in the same indus-
try their stocks had the same price movement. Marcet (2017)
also proposed that when information dissemination through an-
alysts, there would be price co-movement across Latin Ameri-
can stocks. These studies demonstrated that information from
different firms could be obtained and spread by investors, and
the spread of information could lead to the changes of stock
prices which in turn could affect the price movements of other
stocks. In a real stock market, we can see that investors trade
stocks by referring to the performance of other stocks in the
same industry. Sometimes they even refer to the performance of
other stocks in the competitive industry, and trade according to
the opposite sign of the price changes of relevant stocks. These
investors’ behaviors will ultimately have an impact on the stock
correlations. The information dissemination theory proposed in
literature and the above phenomena exist in real stock markets
provide the theoretical and realistic basis for the establishment
of the expected return in our model.
We also propose that an agent makes a decision based on
his or her expected return and historical returns of the stock in
the minority game. The simulation results of our model suggest
that the stock returns are positively (negatively) correlatedwhen
the expected returns are positively (negatively) correlated, and
the correlation of stock returns is proportional to the correla-
tion of the expected returns of the stock. Compared to previous
studies, this paper makes two contributions. First, we propose a
new model based on the MG model to explain the correlations
between stocks from the perspective of agent-based modeling.
Second, we theoretically demonstrate that investors’ expecta-
tion of one stock influenced by another stock essentially leads
to the correlation between the two by both numerical simulation
and analytical analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
present our model and basic assumptions in section 2. The
results and analysis of the simulation are given in section 3.
Finally, we conclude in section 4.
2. Model and assumptions
To study the correlation between individual stocks, we as-
sume the simple case when there are only two stocks traded by
agents. Our model takes the form of a repeated game with an
odd number N of agents who must choose an independent de-
cision of buying or selling actions according to their strategies.
A strategy is a way of decision-making in which an investor
makes a decision according to the information available, includ-
ing the historic returns in last m time steps and the expected re-
turn for a specific stock. Since there are 2m possible bit strings
of historical returns, two possible options (up or down) for each
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Table 1: A strategy of agent i for stock j. Here r j(t − m) ( j = 1, 2) denotes
the historical return of the stock j ( j = 1, 2) at time t − m, and re
j,i
(t) ( j = 1, 2)
denotes the expected return of agent i for stock j ( j = 1, 2) at time t. + (−)
means the return is positive (negative). σi
j
(t) ( j = 1, 2) denotes the decision
that agent i (i = 1, ...,N) makes for stock j ( j = 1, 2) according to the history
and expectation. 1 (−1) means buying (selling) 1 unit of stock.
History Expectation Decision
r j(t − m) ... r j(t − 1) rej,i(t) σij(t)
+ ... + + 1
− ... − − -1
... ... ... ... ...
+ ... + − 1
+ ... − − -1
agent’s expectation, and two decisions of buying or selling ac-
tions, there are a total of 22
m+1
strategies. Table 1 illustrates an
agent’s strategy for the transaction of stock j in our model.
As seen from Table 1, the history of a stock is the stock return
series in the last m steps, which can be accessed by all agents.
Expectation in the table is an agent’s expected return, which is
determined by the agent himself/herself. The agent employs a
specific strategy to determine the trading decision according to
the current history and the expected return. The decision is de-
noted by 1 and -1 respectively in the table, representing buying
or selling 1 unit of stock. Since the agents do not have cash in
our simplified model, which makes it difficult to calculate the
trading capacity of each agent, we assume that each agent has
a trading capacity of one share of each stock in each transac-
tion. We also consider the case when the agent can take a hold-
ing position, making a decision not buying or selling, which
is a common practice to study incentives of the agents to par-
ticipate in the market (Yeung et al., 2008; Challet et al., 2001a;
Giardina and Bouchaud, 2003). As one will see in the results,
the holding decision does not change the main results of our
model.
The expected return is defined as follows. The expected re-
turn of agent i for stock 1 is
re1,i(t) = a1r1(t − 1) + b1,ir2(t − 1), (1)
and the expected return of agent i for stock 2 is
re2,i(t) = a2r2(t − 1) + b2,ir1(t − 1), (2)
where re
j,i
(t) ( j = 1, 2) is the expected return of agent i for stock
j ( j = 1, 2) at time t, and r j(t − 1) ( j = 1, 2) is the return
of stock j ( j = 1, 2) at time t − 1. a j ( j = 1, 2) is the first-
order autocorrelation coefficient of the stock j and b j,i ( j = 1, 2)
denotes the impact of the first-order lag return of the other stock
on stock j for agent i.
We propose the expected return with reference to other stud-
ies on the information dissemination theory. Zhang et al. (2015)
and Chuang (2016) both demonstrated that the dissemination of
information between firms caused stock price co-movement by
constructing the network of different firms. Chen et al. (2015)
proposed that stocks in the same industry shared common char-
acteristics, which resulted in the synchronous prices rises and
falls. Since stock price return is one kind of the most important
information that diffuses in stock markets and studied by schol-
ars, we here introduce the stock price return. Mondria (2010)
found that changes in one asset affected both asset prices and
might lead to asset price co-movement when investors could
choose linear combinations of asset payoffs to update informa-
tion about the assets. Based on these studies, we propose that
the expected return of agents to be in the form of a linear com-
bination of stock returns in our model.
We can also see that investors trade stocks by considering
the performance of other stocks in real stock markets, and this
provides realistic basis for the assumption of the above expec-
tation. The underlying reason for the investors’ behaviors that
focus on the performances of multi assets may lie in the funda-
mental correlations between these stocks, which have business
relationships between each other. For example, investors will
refer to the performance of other stocks in the same industry
when they trade stocks. In particular, investors would tend to
pay attention on the performance of the leading stock, espe-
cially when the leading stock has just experienced a boom or
crash. Sometimes they even refer to the performance of stocks
not in the same industry but in the same industry chain. These
behaviors will ultimately affect investors’ expectations.
To begin with, each agent i randomly picks S strategies from
the full strategy space, sticks with them throughout the game,
and keeps track of the cumulative performance of his or her
trading strategy s (s = 1, ..., S ) by assigning a score U i,s
j
(t) ( j =
1, 2; t = 0, 1, ..., T ) to each of them. The initial scores of the
strategies are set to be zero. Initially, agent i randomly selects
a strategy si among his/her S own strategies, and the trading
decision is also randomly selected since there are no historical
returns and expected return at t = 0. At time step t > 0, each
agent i adopts a strategy si with the highest score. If U
i,si
j
(t) is
the highest at time t, the decision of agent i to trade stock j is
σi
j
(t) = σ
i,si
j
(t) corresponding to the current historical returns
and the expected return of stock j.
After all agents have made their decisions of actions, the ex-
cess demand of stock j at time t is calculated as
A j(t) =
N∑
i=1
σij(t). (3)
A j(t) measures the imbalance between buyers (demand) and
sellers (supply), which represents the force of driving the price
up and down respectively, and is commonly used to update
the price of the stock (Yeung et al., 2008; Challet et al., 2001a,
2000).
The price of stock j at time t is updated according to
P j(t) = P j(t − 1) + sgn[A j(t)]|A j(t)|0.5, (4)
where the square root in the formula is commonly used in
the price dynamics of the MG model (Yeung et al., 2008;
Challet et al., 2000), which is also supported by the evidence
of empirical studies (Zhang, 1999). The return of stock j at
time t is
r j(t) = log(P j(t)) − log(P j(t − 1)). (5)
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The score of strategy s (s = 1, ..., S ) holding by the agent i is
then updated as below
U
i,s
j
(t) = U i,s
j
(t − 1) + gi,s
j
(t), (6)
where the payoffs gi,s
j
(t) to strategy s is
g
i,s
j
(t) = −sgn[A j(t)]σi,sj (t). (7)
The payoff is calculated with the excess demand, which is in
line with the price update. Suppose the excess demand is pos-
itive (negative) and the decision of the strategy is to sell (buy),
the agent sells (buys) a unit of stock with a transaction price at
t, higher (lower) than the current price at t − 1. Therefore, the
strategies which help the agents buy stocks at cheaper prices
and sell stocks at higher price are rewarded, and vice versa.
The rule that the agents in the minority group would win is the
so-called minority game model.
The agent then repeatedly chooses the best strategy from
his/her fixed S strategies according to their updated scores, and
makes the decision of buying or selling action according to the
newly updated historical returns and expected return. The ex-
pected return of agent i for stock j is updated according to
Eqs.(1) and (2). The stock price and score of the strategy are
subsequently updated following Eqs.(4) and (6). The model
evolves by repeating the steps listed above.
3. Simulation results and analysis
For simplicity and the computational efficiency of the model,
we choose the case where N = 1001, m and S are relatively
small e.g., m = 1 and S = 2. We also perform a simulation for
m = 2 and S = 2, and the simulation result is similar to that for
m = 1 and S = 2. The simulation result becomes stable when
T ∼ 1000. Therefore, we choose T to be 1000. The initial price
of our model is set to be 2000, large enough to ensure that the
price is positive throughout the entire evolution period, and the
results are robust to different initial prices.
We also need to determine the values of a j ( j = 1, 2) and b j,i
( j = 1, 2; i = 1, ...,N). We know that a j is the first-order auto-
correlation coefficient of the stock j, and b j,i is the impact that
the first-period lag return of the other stock on stock j for agent
i. Thus, we set the values of a j ( j = 1, 2) based on the first-order
autoregressive coefficient of the stocks in the real market. We
study 15 A-share stocks trade on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges from January 4, 2011 to December 31, 2015.
The data source is from Beijing Gildata RESSET Data Technol-
ogy Co., Ltd, see http://www.resset.cn/. The calculation results
are shown in Table 2.
As seen in Table 2, when the time window increases to five
years, the first-order autoregressive coefficients of all stocks are
greater than 0. Therefore, we take the value of a j ( j = 1, 2)
to be between 0 and 1 in the model. Indeed, we have verified
that the first-order autoregressive coefficients of the simulated
data under the restriction a j ∈ (0, 1] are consistent with those of
the empirical data. We consider nine combinations of different
values of a j, namely a1 = {0.1, 0.5, 1} and a2 = {0.1, 0.5, 1} in
Table 2: First-order autoregressive coefficients of 15 A-share stocks trade on
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from January 4, 2011 to December
31, 2015.
Stock Code 2011 2011-2012 2011-2013 2011-2014 2011-2015
000001 -0.1129 -0.0728 0.0057 -0.0066 0.0161
000002 -0.0824 -0.0563 0.0413 0.0142 0.0430
000004 0.1659 0.1067 0.0642 0.0919 0.1398
000005 0.0330 0.0217 0.0080 0.0658 0.2845
000006 -0.0819 -0.0412 -0.0526 -0.0444 0.0907
000007 0.0948 0.1181 0.1057 0.1388 0.1359
000008 0.1396 0.1834 0.1511 0.2418 0.2124
000009 0.0815 0.0475 0.0171 0.0544 0.0788
600000 -0.0593 -0.0424 0.0106 -0.0032 0.0032
600004 0.0529 0.0083 -0.0255 0.0268 0.0544
600005 0.0561 -0.0029 -0.0075 -0.0092 0.0818
600006 0.0452 0.0428 0.0346 0.0991 0.1285
600007 -0.0983 -0.0942 -0.0559 -0.0364 0.0647
600008 0.0589 0.0299 0.0745 0.0815 0.1354
600009 -0.1029 -0.0810 -0.0449 -0.0110 0.0140
our simulation. Given the values of a j, we now set the values
of b j,i ( j = 1, 2; i = 1, ...,N). We will set the values of b j,i in
two cases: all agents with the same expectation and agents with
different expectations. When all agents have the same expected
return, we have b j,i = b j (i = 1, ...,N). We here assume that the
values of b j,i ( j = 1, 2) are between -1 and 1, and the interval
is 0.1. The cases in which b j,i ( j = 1, 2) are greater than 1 and
less than -1 will be presented in subsection 3.2.
After deciding the value for each parameter, one could now
obtain the return series of stock j ( j = 1, 2). To discuss the cor-
relation between two stocks, we calculate the Pearson’s correla-
tion coefficient. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between
two stock return series r1(t) and r2(t) is defined as
ρr =
Cov(r1, r2)√
Var(r1)
√
Var(r2)
, (8)
where Cov(r1, r2) is the covariance of the two stock return se-
ries, and Var(r1) and Var(r2) are the variances of the two stock
return series respectively. We perform 50 runs and take the
mean correlation coefficient as the final simulation result.
3.1. Simulation results and analysis for all agents with the
same expectation
3.1.1. Simulation results
When all agents have the same expected return, we have
b j,i = b j ( j = 1, 2; i = 1, ...,N). We here assume that the
values of b j ( j = 1, 2) are between -1 and 1, and the interval is
0.1. The simulation results for a1 = a2 and a1 , a2 are shown
in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively.
From the simulation result in Fig. 1(a), we can see that the
correlation coefficients between the stock returns are positive
(negative) when b1 > 0 and b2 > 0 (b1 < 0 and b2 < 0), and the
absolute values of the correlation coefficients are large when b1
and b2 are near 1 or -1. We also see that the simulation result
for m = 1 and S = 2 in Fig. 1(b) is not much different from
the result for m = 2 and S = 2 in Fig. 1(a). Hence, we only
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Figure 1: The correlation coefficients between the stock returns for: (a) m = 2,
S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1, (b) m = 1, S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1, (c) m = 1, S = 2
and a1 = a2 = 0.5, (d) m = 1, S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 0.1.
analyze the results form = 1 and S = 2 in the following. In Fig.
1(c), the correlation coefficients between the stock returns are
positive (negative) when b1 > 0 and b2 > 0 (b1 < 0 and b2 < 0),
and the absolute values of the correlation coefficients are large
when b1 and b2 are near 0.5 or -0.5. In Fig. 1(d), the correlation
coefficients between the stock returns are small in most cases,
and the absolute values of the correlation coefficients are large
when b1 and b2 are near 0.1 or -0.1.
From the simulation results in Fig. 2, for example, for a1 = 1
and a2 = 0.1 in Fig. 2(c), it can be seen that the correlation co-
efficients between the stock returns are positive (negative) when
b1 > 0 (b1 < 0), and the absolute value of the correlation co-
efficients are small when b2 is near 0. When b1 > 0 (b1 < 0),
the expected return of stock 2 is almost only affected by stock
1 and the expected return of stock 1 is affected by both stocks,
hence the correlation coefficients between two stock returns are
positive (negative). In addition, the expected return of stock 2 is
almost unaffected by either stocks when b2 is near 0, hence the
correlation coefficient between the stock returns is very small.
Moreover, the results in Figs. 2(e) and 2(f) are similar to the
results in Figs. 2(c) and 2(d) respectively, while the results in
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) are similar to results in Figs. 1(b) and 1(c)
respectively. Therefore, we will take the simulation results in
Fig. 1(b) as a representative to analyze.
We have also checked the results for the case that the agent
can take a holding position, i.e., the agents make trading de-
cisions σi
j
(t) = 1,−1, or 0, which represent buying or selling
a unit of stock, or doing nothing. Here, we show the simula-
tion results for m = 1, S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1 in Fig. 3. In
comparison with the results for the model without holding po-
sition shown in Fig. 1(b), the correlation of the present model
becomes relatively weaker, but the basic behavior remains the
same. The introduction of the holding position does not change
the main results, hence this feature will not be included in our
Figure 2: The correlation coefficients between the stock returns with parame-
ters m = 1 and S = 2 for: (a) a1 = 1 and a2 = 0.5, (b) a1 = 0.5 and a2 = 1, (c)
a1 = 1 and a2 = 0.1, (d) a1 = 0.1 and a2 = 1, (e) a1 = 0.5 and a2 = 0.1, (f)
a1 = 0.1 and a2 = 0.5.
model.
It is worth to study howmuch investors’ expectations of stock
returns account for the stock return correlation when other fac-
tors are included in their trading decisions. For instance the ex-
ogenous factor introduced in Papadopoulos and Coolen (2008),
which considers a case when the market is impacted by exter-
nal events that may represent the actions of market regulators,
or other major natural or political events. We consider the im-
pacts of the external events on the stock returns, upon which
the investors make decisions to buy or sell, therefore study their
influences on investors’ trading decisions. In doing so, the in-
ternal and external contributions to the overall excess demand
are introduced as
A j(t) = A
int
j (t) + A
ext
j (t), (9)
where Aint
j
(t) is the excess demand defined in Eq. (3), and Aext
j
(t)
represents the contribution of external events, which has a gen-
eral formula
Aextj (t) = (−1)θ(t)A˜ jE j(t). (10)
To make Aext
j
(t) more realistic, we use the empirical data of the
news of A-share stocks trade on Shanghai Stock Exchange dur-
ing the period form December 16, 2013 to November 22, 2016
to calculate the average probability of the occurrence of an ex-
ternal event per minute, and use it to determine the probability
p(E j(t) = 1) = 0.0082. The basic results remain to be the same
if p(E j(t) = 1) is not too large. θ(t) is a randomly generated in-
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Figure 3: The correlation coefficients between the stock returns for the case
that the agent can take a holing position with parameters m = 1, S = 2 and
a1 = a2 = 1.
teger, which determines the sign of the impact, positive or neg-
ative when θ(t) is even or odd. A˜ j reflects the impact strength
of the external event, which is measured in units of the stan-
dard deviation s j of A
int
j
(t), i.e., A˜ j = ks j. With the new overall
excess demand defined above, the price is therefore updated ac-
cording to Eq. (4), and the return is consequently generated
according to Eq. (5).
The results of the correlation coefficients between the stock
returns for the case when external events are included in in-
vestors’ trading decisions for k = 1, 2, 3, 4 are shown in Fig. 4.
As the impact strength of external events increases, the correla-
tion between the stocks becomes relatively smaller. However,
the main results are essentially similar to the ones shown in
Fig. 1(b). The returns of the stocks are still correlated under
the interference of exogenous factor like external events, and
this shows that the stock return correlations are largely deter-
mined by the mechanism of the expected returns proposed in
our model.
3.1.2. Analysis of results
From the simulation results, regularities in the correlation co-
efficient between the stock returns can be seen. However, what
causes the regularities, and why the correlation coefficient is
very close to 0 in some cases, while in other cases it is greater
than zero and less than zero? To explain these phenomena, it is
necessary to analyze the source of the stock correlation. From
the assumptions of the model, we know that the correlation be-
tween the stock returns is mainly determined by the agent’s ex-
pected returns of the stocks. Since the expected return of the
agent on one stock takes into account the influence of the other
stock, the correlation between the expected returns is bound to
affect the correlation between the stock returns. To verify our
argument, we should analyze the relationship between the stock
Figure 4: The correlation coefficients between the stock returns for the case that
external events are included into investors’ trading decisions with parameters
m = 1, S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1 for: (a) k = 1, (b) k = 2, (c) k = 3, (d) k = 4.
Figure 5: Scatter plot of the return versus its expected return for (a) stock 1 and
(b) stock 2 with parameters m = 1, S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1. Colors correspond
to the returns of different runs.
return and its expected return. First, we draw the scatter plots
of both stocks. We choose the simulation results when m = 1,
S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1 for the scatter plots, which is shown in
Fig. 5.
It can be seen that the expected returns and returns of the
stocks cluster in three regions in the scatter plots. This is mainly
due to the fact that the memory size m is small. In a minority
game, one will display a multi-peak distribution for the return
when the memory size is small. It can also be seen that there
is a linear relationship between the return and its expected re-
turn. We therefore propose a linear regression model between
the return and its expected return as follows
r j(t) = β0 + β1r
e
j(t) + ǫ, (11)
where r j ( j = 1, 2) and r
e
j
( j = 1, 2) represent the return and the
expected return of stock j respectively. The regression analysis
of the stocks are done separately and the results are given in
Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, there is a significant positive correla-
tion between the return and its expected return. Although re-
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Table 3: Regression results of the stocks for a1 = a2 = 1.
Stock 1 Stock 2
β1 p-value R
2 β1 p-value R
2
0.7174 0 0.7485 0.7172 0 0.7476
gression results suggest that there is a significant correlation
between the two, just how the correlation between the two stock
expected returns affects the correlation between the two stock
returns cannot be understood from the regression model. We
therefore study the correlation between the two stock expected
returns in order to explain the correlation between two stock
returns.
From Figs. 1 and 2, we know that the correlation between
the stock returns is mainly determined by the values of b j ( j =
1, 2). We therefore concentrate on how the values of b j affect
the correlation between the expected returns of the stocks, and
thus the correlation between the stock returns. We here put forth
some concepts for the following discussion. ∆r j(t − 1) = r j(t −
1)− r j(t − 2), ( j = 1, 2) is the change of stock j’s return defined
by the first-order difference at time t − 1. ∆re
j
(t) ( j = 1, 2) is
the change of the expected return of stock j defined by the first-
order difference at time t. From Eqs. (1) and (2), the changes
of the stock expected returns at time t are:{
∆re
1
(t) = a1∆r1(t − 1) + b1∆r2(t − 1)
∆re
2
(t) = a2∆r2(t − 1) + b2∆r1(t − 1). (12)
When a1 = a2 = 1, we have{
∆re
1
(t) = ∆r1(t − 1) + b1∆r2(t − 1)
∆re
2
(t) = ∆r2(t − 1) + b2∆r1(t − 1). (13)
Four separate cases I-IV will be considered for different values
of b j ( j = 1, 2) when a1 = a2 = 1.
I. 0 < b1 < 1 and 0 < b2 < 1
(a) If ∆r1(t − 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) > 0, then{
∆re
1
(t) = ∆r1(t − 1) + b1∆r2(t − 1) > 0
∆re
2
(t) = ∆r2(t − 1) + b2∆r1(t − 1) > 0. (14)
Here, the expected returns of both stocks increase at the same
time, and the correlation between the expected returns is posi-
tive.
(b) If ∆r1(t−1) < 0 and ∆r2(t−1) < 0, the analysis is similar
to I (a). Here, the expected returns of both stocks decrease at
the same time, and the correlation between the expected returns
is positive.
(c) If ∆r1(t − 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) < 0, we discuss the
possibilities for four cases of combinations of ∆re
1
(t) and ∆re
2
(t).
According to Eq. (13), the condition satisfying ∆re
1
(t) < 0
and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 is
− ∆r2(t − 1)
b2
< ∆r1(t − 1) < −b1∆r2(t − 1). (15)
Since −∆r2(t − 1)/b2 > −b1∆r2(t − 1) when ∆r2(t − 1) < 0, Eq.
(15) cannot be satisfied, therefore the case when ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and
∆re
2
(t) > 0 is impossible.
For the case when ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are satisfied,
according to Eq. (13), the condition will be
− b1∆r2(t − 1) < ∆r1(t − 1) < −
∆r2(t − 1)
b2
. (16)
The value range of ∆r1(t − 1) becomes smaller when b1 and b2
approaches 1, and the probability of satisfying this condition
becomes smaller. Therefore, the negative correlation between
the expected returns becomes weaker.
We next discuss the other two cases that the expected returns
are positively correlated. If ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satis-
fied, according to Eq. (13), the condition will be
∆r1(t − 1) > −
∆r2(t − 1)
b2
. (17)
When b2 approaches 1, the lower limit value of ∆r1(t − 1) ap-
proaches −∆r2(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r1(t − 1)
becomes larger, and the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and
∆re
2
(t) > 0 also becomes larger. The probability that the ex-
pected returns of both stocks increase simultaneously is larger,
i.e., the positive correlation between the expected returns be-
comes stronger. Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are sat-
isfied, the positive correlation of the expected returns is stronger
when b1 approaches 1.
Among the four cases above, three of them are valid, which
include two cases when the expected returns are positively cor-
related with large probability. Therefore the correlation are pos-
itive on average, and the positive correlation becomes stronger
when b j ( j = 1, 2) approaches 1.
(d) If ∆r1(t−1) < 0 and ∆r2(t−1) > 0, the analysis is similar
to I (c), see Appendix A I (d) for details. Here, the positive cor-
relation between the expected returns becomes stronger when
b j ( j = 1, 2) approaches 1.
From I (a)-I (d), we see that the expected returns of the stocks
are positively correlated, and the expected return correlation is
stronger when b j ( j = 1, 2) is closer to 1.
II. −1 < b1 < 0 and −1 < b2 < 0
The analysis is similar to I, see Appendix A II for details.
Here, the expected returns of the stocks are negatively corre-
lated, and the expected return correlation is stronger when b j
( j = 1, 2) is closer to -1.
III. 0 < b1 < 1 and −1 < b2 < 0
(a) If ∆r1(t− 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t− 1) > 0, ∆re1(t) is always posi-
tive. There are two possible cases for ∆re
2
(t), namely ∆re
2
(t) > 0
and ∆re
2
(t) < 0.
If ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied, according to Eq.
(13), the condition will be
∆r2(t − 1) > −b2∆r1(t − 1). (18)
When b2 approaches -1, the lower limit value of ∆r2(t − 1) ap-
proaches ∆r1(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r2(t − 1)
becomes smaller, and the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0
and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 becomes smaller. The probability that the ex-
pected returns of both stocks increase simultaneously becomes
smaller, i.e., the positive correlation between the expected re-
turns becomes weaker.
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Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are satisfied, the nega-
tive correlation between the expected returns becomes stronger
when b2 approaches -1.
(b) If ∆r1(t − 1) < 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) < 0, the analysis is
similar to III (a), see Appendix A III (b) for details. Here, the
positive (negative) correlation between the expected returns be-
comes weaker (stronger) when b2 approaches -1.
(c) If ∆r1(t − 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) < 0, ∆re2(t) is always
negative. There are two cases for ∆re
1
(t), namely ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and
∆re
1
(t) > 0.
If ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are satisfied, according to Eq.
(13), the condition will be
∆r2(t − 1) < −
∆r1(t − 1)
b1
. (19)
When b1 approaches 1, the upper limit value of ∆r2(t − 1) ap-
proaches −∆r1(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r2(t − 1)
becomes larger, and the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and
∆re
2
(t) < 0 becomes larger. The probability that the expected
returns of both stocks decrease simultaneously becomes larger,
i.e.,the positive correlation between the stock expected returns
becomes stronger.
Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are satisfied, the neg-
ative correlation between the stock expected returns is weaker
when b1 approaches 1.
(d) If ∆r1(t−1) < 0 and ∆r2(t−1) > 0, the analysis is similar
to III (c), see Appendix A III (d) for details. Here, the neg-
ative (positive) correlation between the stock expected returns
becomes weaker (stronger) when b1 approaches 1.
From III (a)-III (d), we observe that the positive correlation
between the expected returns is stronger when b1 is closer to 1.
We also observe that the negative correlation between the stock
expected returns is stronger when b2 is closer to -1.
IV. −1 < b1 < 0 and 0 < b2 < 1
The analysis is similar to III, see Appendix A IV for details.
The positive correlation between the stock expected returns is
stronger when b2 is closer to 1. We also observe that the nega-
tive correlation between the expected returns is stronger when
b1 is closer to -1.
From Fig. 5 and Table 3, we can see that there is a signif-
icant positive correlation between the returns and expected re-
turns. We summarize the results of simulated returns based on
the correlation of expected returns in the following.
1. The correlation between the stock returns is positive when
0 < b1 < 1 and 0 < b2 < 1, and gets stronger as b j
( j = 1, 2) increases.
2. The correlation between the stock returns is negative when
−1 < b1 < 0 and −1 < b2 < 0, and the correlation is
stronger when b j ( j = 1, 2) decreases.
3. The correlation between the stock returns is weak when
0 < b1 < 1 and −1 < b2 < 0, and it changes from negative
to positive as b j ( j = 1, 2) increases.
4. The correlation between the stock returns is weak when
−1 < b1 < 0 and 0 < b2 < 1, and it changes from negative
to positive as b j ( j = 1, 2) increases.
We can also observe the correlation between the stock returns
from Fig. 1(b). The results in Fig. 1(b) and the analytic results
in the above thus agree with each other.
3.2. Simulation results and analysis for agents with different
expectations
In a real stock market, agents are heterogeneous and their
expected returns are not exactly the same. Indeed, we can con-
sider the heterogeneous agents that have different values for
both a j and b j,i ( j = 1, 2; i = 1, ...,N), according to the def-
inition of expected return in Eqs. (1) and (2). However, the
parameter b j,i can reflect the information dissemination through
stocks, which plays a core role in explaining the correlation be-
tween stocks. Besides, we have also studied the case with a
uniform distribution of a j ∼ U(0, 1), and found that the results
remain similarly. Hence, we mainly focus on the parameter b j,i
and show the simulation results for its different values in the fol-
lowing discussion. We will make an additional assumption that
each agent i in the model matches a unique b j,i ( j = 1, 2), which
is subject to a uniform distribution, i.e., b j,i ∼ U(c j−δ j, c j+δ j).
The center of the distribution is c j, and the distribution range is
2δ j.
It is worth to note that the results do not depend on the spe-
cific formula of the distribution, but only the symmetry feature
of the distribution significantly affect the results. As one will
see in the following discussions on the distributions with vary-
ing centers and ranges, the correlation between the stocks is
positive or negative when the distribution center is bias to pos-
itive or negative, which may be driven by the forces of news or
big events in real stock markets. For the distribution which is
symmetric about 0, things cancel out each other and the stocks
therefore become uncorrelated.
3.2.1. Simulation results for the distribution with varying dis-
tribution center and fixed distribution range
The simulation result for a1 = a2 = 1 and δ1 = δ2 = 1
is shown in Fig. 6. Centers c1 and c2 are from -1 to 1, and
the intervals are 0.2. The result in Fig. 6 suggests that the
correlation coefficient is proportional to c1 and c2.
3.2.2. Analysis of results for the distribution with varying dis-
tribution center and fixed distribution range
Similar to the analysis in subsubsection 3.1.2, we first ana-
lyze the relationship between the return and its expected return.
We draw the scatter plots of the returns versus expected returns
of the stocks for four cases of c1 and c2 in Fig. 7, namely, I.
0 < c1 < 1 and 0 < c2 < 1, II. −1 < c1 < 0 and −1 < c2 < 0,
III. 0 < c1 < 1 and −1 < c2 < 0, IV. −1 < c1 < 0 and
0 < c2 < 1. A linear relationship between the return and its
expected return can be observed in Fig. 7.
We therefore perform a regression analysis for the stocks us-
ing Eq. (11), and the results are presented in Table 4. One can
see from Table 4 that there is a significant positive correlation
between the return and its expected return when b1 and b2 are
uniformly distributed.
Using the linear relationship between the return and its ex-
pected return, one can obtain the correlation between the returns
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Figure 6: The correlation coefficients between the stock returns when m = 1,
S = 2, a1 = a2 = 1 and δ1 = δ2 = 1.
Table 4: Regression results of two stocks for a1 = a2 = 1 and δ1 = δ2 = 1.
c1 c2
Stock 1 Stock 2
β1 p-value R
2 β1 p-value R
2
0 < c1 < 1 0 < c2 < 1 0.6195 0 0.8806 0.6266 0 0.8847
0 < c1 < 1 −1 < c2 < 0 0.7219 0 0.7335 0.7106 0 0.7387
−1 < c1 < 0 −1 < c2 < 0 0.6249 0 0.8844 0.6193 0 0.8849
−1 < c1 < 0 0 < c2 < 1 0.7173 0 0.7473 0.7173 0 0.7371
from the correlation between the expected returns. From Eq.
(12), the variations of the expected returns of stock j ( j = 1, 2)
for agent i (i = 1, ...,N) at time t are
{
∆re
1,i
(t) = a1∆r1(t − 1) + b1,i∆r2(t − 1)
∆re
2,i
(t) = a2∆r2(t − 1) + b2,i∆r1(t − 1). (20)
The average variations of the expected returns for stock 1 and
stock 2 are
∆re
1
(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
a1∆r1(t − 1) + 1N
N∑
i=1
b1,i∆r2(t − 1)
∆re
2
(t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
a2∆r2(t − 1) + 1N
N∑
i=1
b2,i∆r1(t − 1),
(21)
where b1,i and b2,i are the values of b1 and b2 for agent i respec-
tively. Since b1 and b2 are subject to the uniform distribution,
we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
b1,i = c1,
1
N
N∑
i=1
b2,i = c2. (22)
From Eqs. (21) and (22), we see that the average variations
of the expected returns for the stocks when a1 = a2 = 1 are
{
∆re
1
(t) = ∆r1(t − 1) + c1∆r2(t − 1)
∆re
2
(t) = ∆r2(t − 1) + c2∆r1(t − 1).
(23)
We now study the correlation of the expected returns from
Eq. (23) for different values of c1 and c2. Eq. (23) here takes the
Figure 7: Scatter plots of the return versus its expected return for stock 1 with
different values of c1 and c2: (a) 0 < c1 < 1 and 0 < c2 < 1, (b) −1 < c1 < 0
and −1 < c2 < 0, (c) 0 < c1 < 1 and −1 < c2 < 0, (d) −1 < c1 < 0 and
0 < c2 < 1. Scatter plots of the returns versus expected returns for stock 2 with
different values of c1 and c2: (a) 0 < c1 < 1 and 0 < c2 < 1, (b) −1 < c1 < 0
and −1 < c2 < 0, (c) 0 < c1 < 1 and −1 < c2 < 0, (d) −1 < c1 < 0 and
0 < c2 < 1. Colors correspond to the returns of different runs, with parameters
m = 1, S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1.
same form as Eq. (13), with c1 replacing b1, and c2 replacing
b2. Similar to the analysis for fixed values of b1 and b2, four
separate cases will be considered here.
I. 0 < c1 < 1 and 0 < c2 < 1
The positive correlation between the expected returns is
stronger when c1 and c2 are close to 1, and is weaker when
c1 and c2 are close to 0.
II. −1 < c1 < 0 and −1 < c2 < 0
The negative correlation between the expected returns is
stronger when c1 and c2 are close to -1, and is weaker when
c1 and c2 are close to 0.
III. 0 < c1 < 1 and −1 < c2 < 0
The positive correlation between the expected returns be-
comes stronger when c1 approaches 1 and c2 approaches 0.
The negative correlation between the expected returns becomes
stronger when c1 approaches 0 and c2 approaches -1.
IV. −1 < c1 < 0 and 0 < c2 < 1
The positive correlation between the expected returns be-
comes stronger when c1 approaches 0 and c2 approaches 1.
The negative correlation between the expected returns becomes
stronger when c1 approaches -1 and c2 approaches 0.
From Fig. 7 and Table 4, we see that there is a significant
positive correlation between the return and its expected return.
Therefore, we can obtain the correlation between the returns
from the analytic results of I-IV, which is summarized below.
1. The correlation of the returns is positive when 0 < c1 < 1
and 0 < c2 < 1, and becomes stronger as c j ( j = 1, 2)
increases.
2. The correlation of the returns is negative when −1 < c1 <
0, and −1 < c2 < 0, and becomes stronger as c j ( j = 1, 2)
decreases.
3. The correlation of the returns is weak when 0 < c1 < 1
and −1 < c2 < 0, and changes from negative to positive as
c j ( j = 1, 2) increases.
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4. The correlation of the returns is weak when −1 < c1 < 0
and 0 < c2 < 1, and changes from negative to positive as
c j ( j = 1, 2) increases.
We can also observe the correlation between the stock returns
from Fig. 6, which agrees with the analysis in this subsection.
3.2.3. Simulation results for the distribution with fixed distri-
bution center and varying distribution range
The simulation results for a1 = a2 = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0
are shown in Fig. 8. The ranges of δ1 and δ2 are from 1 to
5, and the intervals are 0.5. From Fig. 8, we can see that the
correlation coefficients are small, and the correlation between
the stock returns is weak.
Figure 8: The correlation coefficients between the stock returns for m = 1,
S = 2, a1 = a2 = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0.
Figure 9: Scatter plot of the return versus its expected return for (a) stock 1 and
(b) stock 2 with parameters m = 1, S = 2 and a1 = a2 = 1. Colors correspond
to the returns of different runs.
3.2.4. Analysis of results for the distribution with fixed distri-
bution center and varying distribution range
Scatter plots of the returns versus expected returns of the
stocks when c1 = c2 = 0 are shown in Fig. 9. A linear relation-
ship between the return and its expected return can be observed
Table 5: Regression results of stocks 1 and 2 for a1 = a2 = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0.
Stock 1 Stock 2
β1 p-value R
2 β1 p-value R
2
0.9991 0 0.9918 1.0003 0 0.9985
in the figure. We therefore carry out a regression analysis of
the stocks separately with Eq. (11), and the results are given in
Table 5.
From the regression results when b1 and b2 are uniformly
distributed, the regression of both stocks passed the significance
test. There is a significant correlation between the return and its
expected return, and the correlation is positive.
From Eq. (21), we get
{
∆re
1
(t) = a1∆r1(t − 1) + c1∆r2(t − 1)
∆re
2
(t) = a2∆r2(t − 1) + c2∆r1(t − 1).
(24)
When a1 = a2 = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0, we have
{
∆re
1
(t) = ∆r1(t − 1)
∆re
2
(t) = ∆r2(t − 1).
(25)
In this case, we can easily see that the mean value of the ex-
pected return is only relevant to the stock return itself. Hence,
the expected returns of the stocks are uncorrelated. From Fig.
9 and Table 5, we see that the return and its expected return
are strongly correlated, implying that stock returns are not cor-
related. This is confirmed by the simulation results in Fig. 8.
From the simulation results and the analysis of the model, we
find that stock correlations are proportional to the values of b1
and b2, whether they are fixed or subject to uniform distribu-
tions. We also find that the expected returns of agents have a
direct impact on the stock correlations.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we study stock correlations by using a model
based on minority game, in which we propose that an agent’s
expected return of one stock is influenced by the historical re-
turn of the other stock, and an agent makes a decision with his
or her expected return and the historical return of the stock.
We model the stock correlation for all agents with the same
expectation, and find that the investor’s expectation regarding
stock return is an important factor for the stock correlation. We
also find that stock returns are positively (negatively) correlated
when the expectation of returns are positively (negatively) cor-
related, and the correlation of stock returns is proportional to
the correlation of stock expected returns. We then model the
stock correlation for agents with different expectations, and the
simulation results are similar to the results when all agents have
the same expectation. The simulation results also suggest that
the center of the distribution has a significant influence on the
stock correlation but the range of the distribution has no influ-
ence on the stock correlation. These results remain to be true
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when we consider other factors such as external events in fi-
nancial markets. We have therefore demonstrated the underly-
ing mechanism that investors’ expectation return of one stock
is influenced by another stock would lead to a correlation be-
tween two stocks in our model. Two stocks have strong (weak)
correlations when investors believe that the stocks have strong
(weak) impacts on each other.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that one
models the correlations between stocks from the perspective of
agent-based modeling. Our model is derived from the standard
MGmodel, in which the agents are allowed to trademulti-assets
simultaneously. The expected returns of the agents are modeled
with reference to information dissemination in financial mar-
kets. To improve the practicability of the model, we further
introduce variables that model external news and events in fi-
nancial markets and fix their values from the analysis of real
data. These features make our model simulate real stock mar-
kets more closely, and help to expand its practical implications
in many issues dealing with multi-assets or systematic prob-
lems. The model not only can reveal the microscopic mecha-
nism underlying the stock correlations, but also can be applied
to asset pricing, investor decision-making and financial risk reg-
ulations.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we provide more detailed descriptions of
the analysis presented in subsection 3.1.2.
I. 0 < b1 < 1 and 0 < b2 < 1
(d) If ∆r1(t − 1) < 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) > 0, we discuss the
possibilities for four cases of combinations of ∆re
1
(t) and ∆re
2
(t).
According to Eq. (13), the condition satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0
and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 is
− b1∆r2(t − 1) < ∆r1(t − 1) < −
∆r2(t − 1)
b2
. (26)
Since −∆r2(t − 1)/b2 < −b1∆r2(t − 1) when ∆r2(t − 1) > 0, Eq.
(26) cannot be satisfied, therefore this case is impossible.
For the case when ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied,
according to Eq. (13), the condition will be
− ∆r2(t − 1)
b2
< ∆r1(t − 1) < −b1∆r2(t − 1). (27)
Under this condition, the expected returns are negatively cor-
related with a smaller probability as b j ( j = 1, 2) is closer to
1.
We next discuss the other two cases when the expected re-
turns are positively correlated. If ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are
satisfied, according to Eq. (13), the condition will be
∆r1(t − 1) > −b1∆r2(t − 1). (28)
When b1 approaches 1, the lower limit value of ∆r1(t − 1) ap-
proaches −∆r2(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r1(t − 1)
becomes larger, and the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and
∆re
2
(t) > 0 also becomes larger. The probability that the ex-
pected returns of both stocks increase simultaneously is larger,
i.e., the positive correlation of the expected returns becomes
stronger. Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are satis-
fied, the positive correlation of the expected returns becomes
stronger when b2 approaches 1.
For two of the three valid cases, the expected returns are pos-
itively correlated with large probability. Therefore, the corre-
lation are positive on average, and the positive correlation be-
comes stronger when b j ( j = 1, 2) approaches 1.
II. −1 < b1 < 0 and −1 < b2 < 0
(a) If ∆r1(t − 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) > 0, we discuss the
possibilities for four cases of combinations of ∆re
1
(t) and ∆re
2
(t).
According to Eq. (13), the condition satisfying ∆re
1
(t) < 0
and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 is
− ∆r2(t − 1)
b2
< ∆r1(t − 1) < −b1∆r2(t − 1). (29)
Since −∆r2(t − 1)/b2 > −b1∆r2(t − 1) when ∆r2(t − 1) > 0, Eq.
(29) cannot be satisfied, therefore this case is impossible.
For the case when ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied,
according to Eq. (13), the condition will be
− b1∆r2(t − 1) < ∆r1(t − 1) < −
∆r2(t − 1)
b2
. (30)
Under this condition, the expected returns are positively corre-
lated, and its probability becomes smaller when b j ( j = 1, 2) is
closer to -1.
We next discuss the other two cases when the expected re-
turns are negatively correlated. If ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are
satisfied, according to Eq. (13), the condition will be
∆r1(t − 1) > −
∆r2(t − 1)
b2
. (31)
When b2 approaches -1, the lower limit value of ∆r1(t − 1) ap-
proaches ∆r2(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r1(t − 1)
becomes larger, and the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and
∆re
2
(t) < 0 is larger. The negative correlation of the expected
returns is stronger. Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0
are satisfied, the negative correlation of the expected returns is
stronger when b1 approaches -1.
For two of the three valid cases, the expected returns are
negatively correlated with large probability. The correlation
are negative on average, and the negative correlation becomes
stronger when b j ( j = 1, 2) approaches -1.
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(b) If ∆r1(t − 1) < 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) < 0, the analysis is
similar to Appendix A II (a). Here, the negative correlation
of the expected returns becomes stronger when b j ( j = 1, 2)
approaches -1.
(c) If ∆r1(t − 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) < 0, then{
∆re
1
(t) = ∆r1(t − 1) + b1∆r2(t − 1) > 0
∆re
2
(t) = ∆r2(t − 1) + b2∆r1(t − 1) < 0. (32)
Here, the expected return of stock 1 increases while the ex-
pected return of stock 2 decreases, and the expected return of
the stocks move in opposite directions. Therefore the correla-
tion of the expected returns is negative.
(d) If ∆r1(t − 1) < 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) > 0, the analysis is
similar to Appendix A II (c). Here, the expected return of stock
1 decreases while the expected return of stock 2 increases, and
the expected return of the stocks move in opposite directions.
Hence the correlation of the expected returns is negative.
III. 0 < b1 < 1 and −1 < b2 < 0
(b) If ∆r1(t−1) < 0 and ∆r2(t−1) < 0, ∆re1(t) is always nega-
tive. There are two possible cases for ∆re
2
(t), namely ∆re
2
(t) < 0
and ∆re
2
(t) > 0.
If ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are satisfied, according to Eq.
(13), the condition will be
∆r2(t − 1) < −b2∆r1(t − 1). (33)
When b2 approaches -1, the upper limit value of ∆r2(t − 1) ap-
proaches ∆r1(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r2(t − 1)
becomes smaller, the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and
∆re
2
(t) < 0 becomes smaller. The probability that the ex-
pected returns of both stocks decrease simultaneously becomes
smaller, i.e., the positive correlation of the expected returns be-
comes weaker.
Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied, the nega-
tive correlation of the expected returns becomes stronger when
b2 approaches -1.
(d) If ∆r1(t−1) < 0 and ∆r2(t−1) > 0, ∆re2(t) is always posi-
tive. There are two possible cases for ∆re
1
(t), namely ∆re
1
(t) < 0
and ∆re
1
(t) > 0.
If ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied, according to Eq.
(13), the condition will be
∆r2(t − 1) > −
∆r1(t − 1)
b1
. (34)
When b1 approaches 1, the upper limit value of ∆r2(t − 1) ap-
proaches −∆r1(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r2(t − 1)
becomes larger, the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and
∆re
2
(t) > 0 becomes larger. The probability that the expected
returns of both stocks increase simultaneously becomes larger,
i.e., the positive correlation of the expected returns becomes
stronger.
Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied, the neg-
ative correlation of the expected returns becomes weaker when
b1 approaches 1.
IV. −1 < b1 < 0 and 0 < b2 < 1
(a) If ∆r1(t− 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t− 1) > 0, ∆re2(t) is always posi-
tive. There are two possible cases for ∆re
1
(t), namely ∆re
1
(t) > 0
and ∆re
1
(t) < 0.
If ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied, according to Eq.
(13), the condition will be
∆r1(t − 1) > −b1∆r2(t − 1). (35)
When b1 approaches -1, the lower limit value of ∆r1(t − 1) ap-
proaches ∆r2(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r1(t − 1)
becomes smaller, the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and
∆re
2
(t) > 0 becomes smaller. The probability that the ex-
pected returns of both stocks increase simultaneously becomes
smaller, i.e., the positive correlation of the expected returns be-
comes weaker.
Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) < 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied, the neg-
ative correlation of the expected returns is stronger when b1
approaches -1.
(b) If ∆r1(t − 1) < 0 and ∆r2(t − 1) < 0, the analysis here
is similar to Appendix A IV (a). Here, the positive (negative)
correlation of the expected returns becomes weaker (stronger)
when b1 approaches -1.
(c) If ∆r1(t− 1) > 0 and ∆r2(t− 1) < 0, ∆re1(t) is always posi-
tive. There are two possible cases for ∆re
2
(t), namely ∆re
2
(t) > 0
and ∆re
2
(t) < 0.
If ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) > 0 are satisfied, according to Eq.
(13), the condition will be
∆r1(t − 1) > −
∆r2(t − 1)
b2
. (36)
When b2 approaches 1, the lower limit value of ∆r1(t − 1) ap-
proaches −∆r2(t − 1). Therefore, the value range of ∆r1(t − 1)
becomes larger, the probability of satisfying ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and
∆re
2
(t) > 0 is larger. The positive correlation of the expected
returns is stronger.
Similarly, if ∆re
1
(t) > 0 and ∆re
2
(t) < 0 are satisfied, the neg-
ative correlation of the expected returns is weaker when b2 ap-
proaches 1.
(d) If ∆r1(t−1) < 0 and ∆r2(t−1) > 0, the analysis is similar
to Appendix A IV (c). Here, the positive (negative) correlation
of the expected returns becomes stronger (weaker) when b2 ap-
proaches 1.
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